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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Waters appeals from the judgment of conviction, challenging the district court's 
order clarifying her no contact order and denying her motion for sentence reduction. On 
appeal, Waters asserts that the no contact order entered against her fails to comply with 
Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 and that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
her Rule 35 motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In the dead of night, Waters started multiple fires at the house where her ex-
husband and children resided. (PSI, p.14. 1) Their daughter, awake in her bedroom 
when the fires began, saw the flames and smoke and ran to wake her father. (PSI, 
pp.14, 50.) Dr. Waters rushed outside to put out the fire and saw Waters drive away in 
her black Hyundai. (PSI, pp.14, 53.) Dr. Waters contacted police and gave them 
Water's address in Hidden Springs. (PSI, pp.14, 50.) 
An officer dispatched to Water's Hidden Springs home found her en route. (PSI, 
pp.14, 73.) She turned down an alleyway and the officer followed. (Id.) After Waters 
came to a stop, the officer approached her vehicle with his flashlight. (PSI, p.73.) As 
he approached, Waters loudly revved the engine as if she were stepping on the gas 
without the car being in gear. (Id.) The officer verbally ordered Waters to stop, but she 
put the car in gear and quickly sped down the alleyway, striking a wooden fence. (Id.) 
1 The Presentence Investigation Report is included in the record as an electronic 
exhibit. Citations to the PSI reflect the electronically stamped pagination numbers that 
run throughout the exhibit, which do not correspond to the page numbers of the 
individual documents. 
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The officer ran back to his car, activated his emergency lights, and followed Waters. 
(Id.) She then stopped abruptly, leaving skid marks. (PSI, pp.14, 73.) 
As the officer contacted Waters, he noticed the smell of alcohol. (PSI, pp.14-15, 
7 4.) He also saw numerous long matchsticks in her car and a bucket in which he 
smelled accelerant. (PSI. pp.15, 74-75.) Waters failed all of the standardized field 
sobriety tests and was taken to the county jail. (PSI, pp.15, 51, 67-68.) Waters was 
subsequently arrested for first degree arson. (PSI, p.52.) 
The district court entered a no contact order against Waters, effective through the 
duration of her criminal proceedings, prohibiting contact with her ex-husband and 
children. (R., p.11.) Waters requested several modifications of the no contact order. 
(See R., pp.56-57, 84-85, 90-91; 10/26/2010 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-12.) The district court 
denied each without prejudice. (See R., p.98; 10/26/2010 Tr., p.15, Ls.13-19.) 
The state charged Waters with first degree arson and driving under the influence. 
(R., pp.65-66.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state amended the charge in Count I 
to second degree arson and Waters pied guilty to the charges. (R., pp.147-55.) The 
district court entered judgment against Waters and imposed a unified sentence of 15 
years with three and a half years fixed. (R., pp.161-63.) As part of its judgment, the 
district court ordered "that the defendant shall have no contact with Dr. Waters or any of 
her children for an absolute period of two (2) years. After June 20, 2013, the defendant 
may communicate with the protected parties in writing." (R., p.163.) 
Waters filed a motion for clarification of the no contact order, and subsequently 
requested additional modifications. (R., pp.168, 187-89.) Waters also filed a Rule 35 
motion for sentencing leniency. (Motion to Reduce Sentence (Augmentation).) In a 
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subsequent order, the district court found that the no contact order was "vague and 
subject to interpretation and requires clarification." (Order Clarifying No Contact Order 
And Denying Motion For Sentence Reduction (Augmentation) (hereinafter "Order".) The 
district court clarified and modified the no contact order; it did not, however, reduce 
Waters underlying sentence. (Id.) 
Waters filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. (R., pp.174-76.) 
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ISSUES 
Waters states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court enter an invalid criminal no contact order 
against Ms. Waters, and further err by failing to correct the infirmities 
within this order upon being presented with Ms. Waters' motion seeking 
clarification and modifications of this order? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Waters' 
Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of her sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Waters argues that the no contact order entered against her is invalid for failing 
to comply with various requirements listed in I.C.R. 46.2. However, Waters failed to 
raise her argument that the no contact order is deficiently formatted to the district court 
at any time throughout the proceedings below. Has she failed to establish fundamental 
error on appeal entitling her to relief on this unpreserved claim? 
2. Has Waters failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 




Waters Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error Entitling Her To Relief 
A. Introduction 
After Waters' arrest for arson and DUI, the district court imposed a no contact 
order restricting Waters from any contact, without exceptions, with her ex-husband and 
four children. (R., p.11.) Waters requested several times that the district court modify 
the no contact order and grant her telephonic and written contact with her children. 
(See R., pp.56-57, 84-85, 90-91; 10/26/2010 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-12.) The district court did 
not grant Waters' requests. Following Waters' guilty plea, the district court continued 
the no contact order in the judgment of conviction, ordering "that the defendant shall 
have no contact with Dr. Waters or any of her children for an absolute period of two (2) 
years. After June 20, 2013, the defendant may communicate with the protected parties 
in writing." (R., p.163.) Waters, asserting that the no contact order was "vague and 
subject to interpretation," requested clarification of the order. (R., pp.168-69.) The 
district court agreed that the order was subject to interpretation, and subsequently 
clarified the order. (Order, p.2.) 
Ultimately, the district court ordered, 
"that the defendant have no contact with the children for a two (2) year 
period commencing August 6, 2010 and expiring August 6, 2012. Further, 
upon the expiration of the no contact period, the defendant is free to have 
contact with her ex-husband, Dr. Waters, as well as any of the children 
when the children reach the age of eighteen. The children are not 
required to have contact with their mother when they become adults but if 
they choose to have contact with her, said contact will not violate the No 
Contact Order. 
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With respect to the children who will still be minors on August 6, 
2012, the defendant may communicate with the children in writing. The 
Court will allow Dr. Waters to allow the defendant to have telephonic 
communication or personal visits with the children if Dr. Waters, at his 
discretion, will allow it. Otherwise, all communication with the minor 
children shall be in writing. 
(Order, p.3.) Subsequently, the district court modified the no contact order allowing 
Waters' 18-year-old son to have contact with her. (Order Modifying No Contact Order 
(Augmentation); 3/1/2012 Tr., p.44, Ls.19-23.) 
Now, for the first time on appeal, Waters argues that the no contact order 
ultimately entered against her fails to conform to the specific requirements of Idaho 
Criminal Rule 46.2 because it does not identify her children by name, list the dates of 
their respective 18th birthdays, set specific distance restrictions, or provide notices of 
additional criminal liability. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-17.) Throughout Waters' many 
requests for modifications and clarifications of the no contact order, however, she never 
presented this argument to the district court. Because this claim is unpreserved, to be 
entitled to relief Waters must establish fundamental error. Waters has failed to do so. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Generally, issues not raised to the district court may not be considered for the 
first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). An 
unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental 
error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,265,233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). 
6 
C. The District Court's Failure To Conform Its No Contact Order To The Specific 
Requirements Of I.C.R. 46.2 Is Neither Constitutional Nor Prejudicial 
In order to establish that she is entitled to relief on her claim, Waters must 
establish fundamental error under the standard articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). Under Perry, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless. 
~ Waters has failed to meet this appellate burden. 
Waters did not raise to the district court below her claim that the no contact order 
ultimately entered in this case was deficient, and she has not attempted to demonstrate 
fundamental error in this appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.10-17 .) While it appears 
clear on the record, as Waters has argued, that the no contact order ultimately entered 
in this case fails to comply with the specific requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 (compare Order, 
p.3 with I.C.R. 46.2), Waters cannot satisfy the first and third prongs of the Perry 
standard. Therefore, she has failed to establish fundamental error entitling her to relief. 
The first prong of the fundamental error analysis requires an appellant to show 
that her "unwaived constitutional rights were violated." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 
P.3d at 978 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "when an error 
has not been properly preserved for appeal through objection at trial, the appellate 
court's authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error 
results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due 
process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. 
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Thus, "where an error has occurred at trial and was not followed by a contemporaneous 
objection, such error shall only be reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an 
appellate court that one of his unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated." ~ at 
226, 245 P.3d at 978 (emphasis added). Any effort to establish fundamental error in 
this case is doomed to failure because there is no constitutional right to a particular 
format for no contact orders. Rather, the entitlement Waters seeks is statutory, or 
quasi-statutory, at best. (See I.C. § 18-920; I.C.R. 46.2.) Waters, therefore, cannot 
show a violation of an unwaived constitutional right and, consequently, cannot establish 
fundamental error. 
Waters has also failed to show that she is prejudiced by the error she claims. 
Waters does not argue that the substance of the no contact order, prohibiting her from 
having any contact with her children for a period of two years and then limiting her 
contact with her minor children to written contact, is in itself invalid. Rather, her 
argument is that the order was not formatted properly because it does not specifically 
name each child, give the specific dates of termination for the no contact order in 
relation to each child's 18th birthday, list specific distance restrictions, etc., when this 
information could have been included had the district court used the proper form. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-16.) While a properly formatted no contact order is certainly 
preferable to an improperly formatted no contact order, Waters is not prejudiced by the 
format of the no contact order. Certainly Waters knows the names and birthdates of her 
children. Also, as long as she is incarcerated, specific distance restrictions and 
additional notices would seem superfluous. Having failed to show prejudice, she has 
failed to establish fundamental error entitling her to relief. 
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Because Waters has failed to establish fundamental error entitling her to relief, 
this unpreserved issue should not be addressed on appeal.2 
II. 
Waters Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying 
Her Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Waters asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by denying 
her Rule 35 motion for sentence reduction. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-22.) Waters has 
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial of the 
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 
840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Waters must "show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the Rule 35 motion." .!sh 
2 Waters is not without recourse, however. Because her claim of error attacks only the 
incorrect format of the no contact order entered against her and not the substance of 
that order, she may file a motion to correct a clerical mistake under Idaho Criminal Rule 
36 at any time. See I.C.R. 36. Ultimately, the district court should be presented with 
this argument and allowed an opportunity to correct the defects in its no contact order. 
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C. Waters Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In Light Of The Marginal 
New Information Provided To The District Court 
Waters has failed to satisfy her burden of showing an abuse of discretion in light 
of the new information provided in her Rule 35 motion. As shown by the record in this 
case, Waters intentionally set multiple fires at the house where slept her ex-husband 
and three of her children. (PSI, pp.14-19.) As the district court noted during the 
sentencing hearing, that is an "awful crime." (6/20/2011 Tr., p.67, Ls.20-21.) 
At sentencing, the district court considered Waters' lack of a significant criminal 
history (6/20/2011 Tr., p.66, Ls.16-24), her good upbringing, abilities, and education 
(6/20/2011 Tr., p.67, Ls.3-12), her love for her children (6/20/2011 Tr., p.67, L.12), her 
mental health and drug addiction issues (6/20/2011 Tr., p.67, L.22 - p.68, L.14), and the 
letters of support from Waters' family and friends (6/20/2011 Tr., p.77, Ls.12-25). The 
district court also accepted that Waters was not trying to kill her children when she set 
the fires at the house, "[b]ut the fact of the matter is, they would have been just as dead 
had [your daughter] not been awake or at least that was a very real possibility." 
(6/20/2011 Tr., p.74, Ls.17-25.) The district court therefore, recognizing "that a lesser 
sentence than a period of incarceration would depreciate the seriousness of the crime 
that [Waters] committed," imposed a unified sentence of 15 years with three and a half 
years fixed. (6/20/2011 Tr., p.70, Ls.20-22; p.72, Ls.3-4.) 
On appeal, Waters asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
her Rule 35 motion in light of the new and additional information she provided, such as 
prison overcrowding inhibiting her access to programming until 2013, the lack of drug or 
mental health counseling in the Program for Recovering Nurses, her model behavior 
while incarcerated, and an additional letter of support from her father. (Appellant's brief, 
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pp.17-20.) The district court, after reviewing this information, found "that the sentence 
was appropriate at the time it was imposed" and was "not convinced that circumstances 
have changed or that the Court improperly imposed the sentence." (Order, p.2.) The 
district court properly exercised its discretion. 
Waters' new information focuses on Waters' potential for rehabilitation. At 
sentencing, the district court explained: 
Now, I understand, too, that rehabilitation is one of the most 
important and laudable goals in sentencing. And, [defense counsel], for 
your benefit, I did consider but rejected the idea of giving [Waters] a rider. 
I thought perhaps that if I gave her a period of retained jurisdiction, she 
has already got 320 days in jail. She would probably be out after about a 
120-day rider, to be honest. 
And then maybe order as a term and condition of probation, that 
she participate in and complete either drug court or mental health court. I 
think she might qualify for both, but I rejected that idea based on the 
seriousness of the crime and the protection of society. 
(6/20/2011 Tr., p.68, L.25 - p.69, L 14 (emphasis added).) Nothing presented by 
Waters in terms of her potential for rehabilitation changes the district court's analysis. 
Waters committed a serious crime that placed others at great risk. Any sentence less 
than incarceration would depreciate the seriousness of that crime. 
The district court's sentence offers Waters an opportunity for rehabilitation while 
in confinement. However, "[r]ehabilitation-important as it may be-is not the sole 
objective of our criminal justice system." State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 294, 805 P.2d 
498, 500 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In addition to rehabilitation, the district court's sentence also 
provides some deterrence to Waters and others, punishment for her serious crime, and, 
most importantly, "accomplish[es] the primary objective of protecting society." State v. 
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,568,650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). The sentence imposed 
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by the district court was thus reasonable and remains so despite the information in 
Waters' Rule 35 motion. Waters has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's 
sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Waters conviction and 
sentence. 
DATED this 7th day of September. 2012. 
~R 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of September, 2012, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SARAH TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
RJS/pm 
LL J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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